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Research on adult populations has widely investigated the deep differences that
characterize individuals who embrace either conservative or liberal views of the world.
More recently, research has started to investigate these differences at very early stages of
life. One major goal is to explore how parental political ideology may influence children’s
characteristics that are known to be associated to different ideological positions. In the
present work, we further investigate the relations between parents’ ideology and children
cognitive processing strategies within the framework of political ideology as motivated
social cognition (Jost et al., 2003) and the dual processmodel of political ideology (Duckitt
et al., 2002). Specifically, epistemic (implicit attitudes toward order vs. chaos), existential
(negativity and threat bias), and relational needs (conformity measure) were assessed in
pre-school children (N = 106; 4–6 years). For each child at least one parent completed
both the Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) and the Right Wing Authoritarianism
(RWA) measures. Interestingly, results indicated that mothers’ and fathers’ responses
had unique associations with children’s socio-cognitive motivations, and different findings
emerged in relation to the two facets of parental authoritarianism, namely dominance
(i.e., SDO) and submission (i.e., RWA). More specifically, children’s existential needs
appeared to be more related to mothers’ RWA scores, whereas children’s epistemic
needs appeared to be more related to fathers’ SDO. Finally, parents’ RWA and SDO
scores appeared to have opposite effects on children’s relational needs: children’s
conformity increased at increasing levels of mothers’ RWA and decreased at increasing
levels of fathers’ SDO. Overall, however, results were relatively weak and several links
between the responses of parents and their children were not significant, suggesting
caution in drawing strong conclusions about the impact of parents’ ideology. Limitations
and future developments will be discussed.
Keywords: political ideology, authoritarianism, motivated social cognition, dual process models, automatic
processing, intergenerational transmission, parental influence
Guidetti et al. Intergenerational Transmission of Political Ideology
INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, there has been a renewed interest in the
study of political ideology from the psychological perspective
(e.g., Jost et al., 2008b). More specifically, research has largely
documented how political ideology is correlated with several
distinct psychological (e.g., threat sensitivity, Jost et al., 2007),
cognitive (e.g., need for cognitive closure, Jost et al., 2007) and
neuropsychological (Amodio et al., 2007; Kanai et al., 2011)
features. Overall, the key message of these studies is that political
ideology actually goes beyond the political field in a strict sense,
and it may be reflected in several aspects of everyday life, such
as nonverbal behavior in the context of social interaction and
characteristics of living and working spaces (Carney et al., 2008).
For this reason, it is important and interesting to investigate when
and how these differences may start to emerge in very young
children and what their likely determinants are. The aim of the
present investigation is indeed to examine these differences in
young children (4–6 years), in relation to their parents’ political
attitudes, within the framework of political ideology as motivated
social cognition (Jost et al., 2003) and of the dual process model
of ideology and prejudice (DPM; Duckitt, 2001).
Political Ideology As Motivated Social
Cognition
According to the model of political ideology as motivated social
cognition (Jost et al., 2003, 2009; Jost and Amodio, 2012),
ideology meets epistemic, existential, and relational needs of
certainty, security, and affiliation. In other words, a dispositional
or situational heightened motivation to reduce uncertainty,
threat or isolation drives the preference for stability over change
and the acceptance of inequalities, which are the two core aspects
of conservative ideology.
To start with epistemic motives, individual differences
pertaining to the management of uncertainty have been shown to
predict conservative positions. Indeed, individuals characterized
by higher need for structure (Altemeyer, 1998), higher Need for
Cognitive Closure (e.g., Kemmelmeier, 1997; Chirumbolo, 2002;
Chirumbolo et al., 2004; Van Hiel et al., 2004; Jost et al., 2007;
Leone and Chirumbolo, 2008; Hennes et al., 2012), and lower
Need for Cognition (e.g., Sargent, 2004; Federico and Schneider,
2007) appear to also embrace more conservative views of the
world. Not only dispositional differences, but also situational
factors affect ideological positions. For instance, distractions or
high cognitive load induce people to adopt more conservative
attributional styles (Skitka et al., 2002).
To continue with security needs, conservatives have also
been shown to be more sensitive to threat as compared to
liberals. As far as existential fear is concerned, a line of research
suggests that death anxiety tends to be associated with political
conservatism, right-wing authoritarianism and system justifying
beliefs (Wilson, 1973; Jost et al., 2003, 2007; Hennes et al.,
2012). Experimental studies also showed that manipulations of
mortality salience (e.g., Landau et al., 2004; Cohen et al., 2005;
Nail et al., 2009) and terrorism salience (Ullrich and Cohrs, 2007)
tend to shift people’s political opinions and preferences toward
conservatism (but see also Kosloff et al., 2010; Lambert et al.,
2010 for different results). Besides fear, disgust is also associated
to political ideology. Indeed, both correlational and experimental
studies (Hodson and Costello, 2007; Inbar et al., 2009, 2012;
Terrizzi et al., 2010; Helzer and Pizarro, 2011), indicated that
individuals holding conservative opinions are more sensitive to
disgust than liberals.
In a related vein, conservatives are more likely than liberals
to perceive the world as a dangerous place (Altemeyer, 1998;
Duckitt et al., 2002; Mirisola et al., 2014) and to interpret
ambiguous facial stimuli as expressing threatening emotions
(Vigil, 2010). Conservatives are also more cautious in exploring
novel situations and give more weight to negative as compared to
positive information in impression formation tasks (Shook and
Fazio, 2009; Castelli and Carraro, 2011; Carraro et al., 2014). In
addition, conservatives have been shown to display an automatic
selective attention to negative stimuli (Carraro et al., 2011; for a
review cf. Hibbing et al., 2014).
Finally, relational motives also seem to predict the adoption
of conservative ideology (see Jost et al., 2008a). For example,
right-wing and authoritarian people have been found to value
conformity better than liberals (Feldman, 2003; Cavazza and
Mucchi-Faina, 2008) and those endorsing conservative views
also have a higher need to achieve a shared view of reality
(Hennes et al., 2012). In addition, an experimental study (Jost
et al., 2008a) showed that affiliation motives could actually
affect political ideology. Indeed, students who had imagined an
interaction with their more conservative parent subsequently
displayed higher system-justifying beliefs than those who had
imagined an interaction with their liberal parent.
Concluding, research involving adult respondents has overall
demonstrated that conservatives are characterized by higher
epistemic, existential and relational needs as compared to liberals.
We thus expected that children of conservative parents would
also be more likely to display higher need for certainty, security,
and affiliation than children of liberal parents.
The Two Sides of Authoritarianism
The investigation of the structure of socio-political and
socio-cultural attitudes and values (for a review, cf. Duckitt,
2001) typically elicited two relatively orthogonal dimensions
broadly corresponding to Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA;
Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) and Social Dominance Orientation
(SDO; Sidanius and Pratto, 1993, 1999). Initially conceived as a
personality dimension (Adorno et al., 1950; Altemeyer, 1981),
RWA is now considered as a collection of generalized attitudes
and beliefs (e.g., Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; VanHiel et al.,
2004), likewise SDO, which was originally designed as such.
According to the DPM (Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt and
Sibley, 2009), RWA and SDO scales capture two distinct
and relatively independent ideological attitude dimensions,
stemming from different situational factors, personality traits,
and social worldviews. Individuals high on social conformity (vs.
autonomy, or openness to experience in Big-Five terms) tend
to believe that the social world is dangerous and threatening
and thus to pursue the motivational goals of security and social
control (vs. personal freedom and autonomy) expressed in high
RWA scores. Therefore, RWA is also labeled as authoritarian
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submission. On the other hand, individuals high on tough-
mindedness (vs. tender-mindedness, or agreeableness in Big-Five
terms) tend to perceive the world as a ruthlessly competitive
jungle and thus to pursue the motivational goals of power,
superiority over others and dominance (vs. care, share and help)
expressed in high SDO scores. Therefore, SDO is also labeled as
authoritarian dominance.
In the present study, we measured both authoritarian
submission (i.e., RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988) and authoritarian
dominance (i.e., SDO; Sidanius and Pratto, 1993, 1999) in order
to achieve a more nuanced assessment of the links between
parental ideology and children’s socio-cognitive responses.
Parental Influence in the Domain of
Political Attitudes
It is generally assumed that political ideology is to a large
extent transmitted from parents to children (Adorno et al.,
1950; Altemeyer, 1988). A large sample longitudinal set of
studies including three generations (Jennings and Niemi, 1968;
Jennings et al., 2009) confirmed that, besides the indirect
parental influence exerted by placing their children in a given
sociopolitical milieu, parents can also have a strong direct
influence on children’s political learning. This direct influence
is likely to be exerted through both socialization and genetic
transmission. As for the former process, for instance, Adorno
et al. (1950) assumed that parenting styles are both antecedents
and consequences of authoritarianism. Indeed, although there
is only very weak evidence of an association between parents’
ideology and parenting styles (Boshier and Izard, 1972), the latter
have been shown to affect children’s political ideology (e. g.,
Miklikowska and Hurme, 2011; Fraley et al., 2012). As for the
genetic transmission, several studies (e.g., Eaves and Eysenck,
1974; Tesser, 1993; Olson et al., 2001; Bouchard et al., 2003;
Alford et al., 2005; Kandler et al., 2012), comparing monozygotic
and dizygotic adult twins, indicate that political ideology can also
be genetically determined, with heritability explaining about 50%
of the variance in relation to attitudes toward several political
issues.
In addition, there are some clues of specific intergenerational
transmission for the described two sides of the authoritarianism
coin, SDO and RWA. Indeed, young adults’ and adolescents’
levels of RWA (Altemeyer, 1988; Peterson and Duncan, 1999;
Duriez et al., 2008) and SDO (Duriez et al., 2008) have
been found to correlate with their parents’ responses on
the correspondent measures. More importantly, in line with
the 90,000 DPM (Duckitt et al., 2002), research indicated
that authoritarian submission and dominance are rooted in
different socialization experiences. Indeed, Duckitt (2001) has
shown that punitive and strict parenting is associated to
RWA (through social conformity and dangerous-world beliefs),
while neglecting and unaffectionate parenting is associated
to SDO (through tough-mindedness and competitive-jungle
beliefs).
In a similar way, though from a different perspective,
Duriez et al. (2008) found that these distinct dimensions
of authoritarianism were specifically predicted by different
parental goal promotion efforts that were linked, in turn, to
parents’ ideology. In particular, conservation (vs. openness to
change) goal promotion mediated parent-child correlation in
RWA, while extrinsic (vs. intrinsic) goal promotion mediated
parent-child correlation in SDO. Focusing on the outcomes
of socialization experiences, Weber and Federico (2007) also
showed that anxious attachment styles predicted RWA while
avoidant attachment predicted SDO, through the correspondent
worldviews respectively (but see also Roccato, 2008; Lorito and
Falgares, 2013).
It is worth noting that this research on parent-child
resemblance in RWA and SDO, such as that on parent-
child resemblance in other measures of political ideology (e.g.,
Jennings and Niemi, 1968; Acock and Bengtson, 1978; Jennings
et al., 2009), involved young adults or adolescents as offspring.
This is consistent with the general assumption that sociopolitical
orientation crystallizes in young adulthood (e.g., Altemeyer,
1998). However, there is reason to predict that those epistemic
(e.g., need for closure), existential (e.g., threat sensitivity), and
relational (e.g., social conformity) needs that are known to be
associated to ideology in adult populations may also be detected
among children as a function of the ideological placement of
their parents. To date, only two studies tested this hypothesis.
In the former (Reifen Tagar et al., 2014), 3–4 year old children’s
deference to convention and authority was investigated as a
function of parents’ authoritarian and social conformity values.
As predicted, Reifen Tagar et al. (2014) found higher sensitivity
to adults’ conventionality and status, when deciding whether
to trust them in a labeling objects game, among children
of parents who were high (vs. low) in authoritarianism and
social conformity values. In another study, Dennis et al. (2015)
examined 5–7 year old children’s neurocognitive responses
to conflict as a function of parental ideology and emotional
context. Their results showed larger N2 amplitudes (indicating
enhanced recruitment of cognitive resources to detect and resolve
conflict) in threatening conditions among children of liberal
parents as compared to children whose parents embrace more
conservative or moderate political views. These results show
that psychosocial and neural differences associated with parents’
political views can be detected at a very young age, long before the
development of sophisticated political beliefs. These fascinating
recent lines of research (Reifen Tagar et al., 2014; Dennis
et al., 2015), suggesting that a psychological predisposition to
embrace certain political views is already present at pre-school
age, prompted us to further investigate the differential effects
of parents’ authoritarianism dimensions on their very young
children.
The Present Study
Drawing on the previously described research findings, we
here tested the general hypotheses that children of conservative
parents would display greater needs for certainty, security,
and affiliation as compared to children of liberal parents. In
operational terms, given that conservative adults, compared with
liberal ones, are more attentive to threatening stimuli (e.g.,
Carraro et al., 2011), exhibit a stronger implicit preference
for order vs. chaos (Jost et al., 2008b) and have more
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positive attitudes toward social conformity (e.g., Cavazza and
Mucchi-Faina, 2008), we expected that children of conservative
(vs. liberal) parents would score higher on measures of
negativity/threat bias (assessed as proxies of existential needs),
implicit attitudes toward order vs. chaos (as a proxy of epistemic
needs), and social conformity to peers (as a proxy of relational
needs). Since it is not clear whether conservatives are biased
toward negative stimuli in general or only in relation to
threatening stimuli (Lilienfeld and Latzman, 2014), we included
measures that enabled us to assess attentional biases elicited
by both threatening stimuli and negative stimuli that are not
expected to trigger any threat.
Moreover, besides these general hypotheses, we also explored
how the distinct dimensions of parental authoritarianism (i.e.,
SDO and RWA) might be differentially associated to the various
dependent measures administered to the children. To the best
of our knowledge, past research is not very informative about
the differential effect of the socio-cognitive motives underlying
ideology Jost et al., 2003 on authoritarian submission and
dominance (but see Van Hiel et al., 2004 for an exception). These
constructs are often addressed by separate literatures, which have
not yet been fully integrated, but specific hypotheses can be
put forward. First, we expected that parental RWA, as rooted
in a view of the world as a dangerous place, would predict
children’s sensitivity to threat and could predict their sensitivity
to negativity. Second, we expected that parental SDO, as based
on a perception of the world as a competitive jungle, might
lead to a higher need for order in children, foreshadowing a
preference for hierarchy as a form of regularity and arrangement.
In addition, following Van Hiel et al. (2004) who showed
that adults’ need for simple structure predicted not only their
SDO but also their RWA score, we hypothesized that parental
RWA would also be associated with children’s need for order.
Finally, as for the relational needs of children, we expected that
whereas parental authoritarian submission, valuing obedience
and conventionalism, should increase children’s tendency to
conform, authoritarian dominance, characterized by a need of
prevailing and being superior, might reduce children’s social
conformity to peers.
Finally, in the present study we separately investigated the
impact of mothers’ and fathers’ ideology on children’s responses.
Indeed, having an independent assessment of ideology from
both parents is crucial on order to estimate the role of each
parental figure while controlling for the eventual influence of
the other parent. The scarcity of previous studies prevents us
from formulating straightforward hypotheses, although some
research findings suggest that mothers might be in general more
influential than fathers (Acock and Bengtson, 1978; Castelli et al.,
2009).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants and Procedure
This study was carried out in accordance with the
recommendations of the ethical committee for psychological
research at the University of Padova. We recruited participant
families in 4 kindergartens in a medium sized town in Northern
Italy. One-hundred and six children1 (50 males) aged 4–6 years
(M = 5.18, SD = 0.56) were individually interviewed in a quiet
room by a researcher after having obtained written permission
from the parents in accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
Children were asked to perform a series of tasks (presented as
games) on a computer laptop. In order to simplify the task, we
used a keyboard with three different colored labels on the 3
response keys (blue for the left key, yellow for the central key
and red for the right key). At least one parent for each child
filled in a questionnaire at home and returned it in a closed
envelope. Overall, we obtained responses from 85 fathers and
102 mothers, aged 24–62 years (M = 41.17, SD = 5.52), for a
total of 83 complete triads. As for the educational level of the
involved parents, 40.2% of them declared a senior high-school
leaving accreditation and 41.8% had a university level degree.
Parents’ Measures
Parents completed the Italian version (Roccato et al., 2009) of the
Right Wing Authoritarianism scale by Funke (2005; 12 items)
and an Italian short version (Di Stefano and Roccato, 2005; 8
items) of the Social Dominance Orientation Scale (Pratto et al.,
1994). Responses were provided on 5-point Likert scales ranging
from “completely disagree” to “completely agree.” We computed
average scores for each measure for both mothers (RWA α =
0.63; SDO α= 0.81) and fathers (RWA α= 0.64; SDO α= 0.87).
As measures of authoritarianism could be inflated by social
desirability bias (Taylor, 1961), we followed other authors
(e.g., Duriez and Van Hiel, 2002; Ekehammar et al., 2004) in
administering the Short Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability
Scale (Reynolds, 1982; 13 item). Participants answered on 5-
point Likert scales ranging from “completely false” to “completely
true.” An average score was computed for each parent (mothers
α= 0.62; fathers α= 0.74).
Children’s Measures
Implicit Attitudes toward Order vs. Chaos
Children first completed an Implicit Association Test (IAT;
Greenwald et al., 1998) involving a sequence of five trial
blocks (three practice and two critical blocks). Each trial block
included instructions about the category discriminations and
key assignments. In the first block (practice block), participants
categorized attribute stimuli as happy vs. sad emoticons. In the
following block (practice block), they had to categorize ordered
vs. disordered sets of geometrical figures (6 stimuli for each
category; see Figure 1). The third block (critical block) required
a combined categorization task, and all stimuli were presented
(emoticons and geometrical figures). A specific response key had
to be pressed if either positive emoticons (i.e., happy) or ordered
figures appeared on the screen, whereas another response key
had to be pressed if negative emoticons (i.e., sad or angry)
or disordered figures were displayed (i.e., compatible block for
participants with a preference for order vs. chaos). In the fourth
block (practice block), the response keys for pictures of ordered
and disordered figures were reversed as compared to the second
1The exact number of participants changes across tasks because not all the children
completed all the tasks. Moreover, some participants were discarded in some tasks
on the basis of the percentage of incorrect responses.
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FIGURE 1 | Target stimuli used in the IAT. (A) Disordered geometrical figures. (B) Ordered geometrical figures.
trial block. The fifth and final block (critical block) was again a
combined categorization task, but this time positive emoticons
and disordered figures, on the one hand, and negative emoticons
and ordered figures, on the other, shared the same response key
(i.e., non-compatible block for participants with a preference
for order vs. chaos). The order of the third and fifth critical
block, as well as the order of the second and the fourth block,
were counterbalanced across participants, so that half of them
performed the compatible block prior to the non-compatible,
as reported above, whereas the other half performed the non-
compatible prior to the compatible block. The practice blocks
included 12 trials and the test blocks included 40 trials each. A
similar IAT has already been used with adult participants (Jost
et al., 2008a).
During this task, the experimenter constantly monitored the
children while they performed the initial practice phases of
the IAT. When it was evident that participants had not well
understood the task (e.g., they always pressed the same response
key), the experimenter gave the instructions a second time and
invited the children to go through the practice phases again.
Seventeen children repeated the at least one of the first two
practice blocks and then completed the task smoothly. Only one
child continued to have problems in performing the task and
therefore the critical blocks were not administered. Moreover,
three children interrupted the task because they reported to be
tired and their data were thus excluded from the analyses.
Before computing the individual attitude score, we dropped
one participant who made more than 30% of errors in the critical
blocks. We computed an IAT score accordingly to the algorithm
proposed by Greenwald et al. (2003) in such a way that positive
values indicate a preference for order rather than chaos. The
reliability of the IAT was good and comparable to that observed
in the case of adult populations (α= 0.81).
It has to be remarked that the IAT has been successfully used in
several previous studies with preschool-aged children in relation
to a wide-range of attitude objects (e.g., racial attitudes, gender
attitudes, attitudes toward flowers and insects, attitudes toward
minimal groups; e.g., Baron and Banaji, 2006; Cvencek et al.,
2011; Dunham et al., 2011; see also Williams and Steele, 2016)
suggesting that the IAT can actually measure significant aspects
of children’s implicit social cognition.
Social Conformity
Social conformity was assessed through an adapted version of a
conformity task (Asch, 1956; see alsoWalker andAndrade, 1996).
Overall, participants were presented with 8 trials (2 practice
trials, 3 neutral trials and 3 experimental trials; see Figure 2).
In the first phase of each trial (i.e., autonomous response),
children were presented with one (standard) line appearing on
the left half of the computer screen, and were asked to indicate
which of three (comparison) lines appearing on the right was
of equal length. The responses were given by pressing one of
the 3 keys (on the computer keyboard) that were painted with
the same colors identifying the 3 comparison lines. The task
was very easy and the correct response was never ambiguous.
In the second phase of each trial (i.e., peer influence), children
were informed about “the responses most of other children of
their age had given in the same trial.” The computer provided
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FIGURE 2 | Example of stimuli used in neutral (A) and experimental (B) trials of the social conformity task.
the information by circling the line that had been allegedly
selected by most children and the experimenter only explained
the meaning of that circle. These peer judgments were correct
in the first 2 (practice) trials and then alternatively correct
(3 neutral trials) and incorrect (3 experimental trials) in the
remaining 6 trials. After being informed about their peers’ bogus
responses, participant children were asked to select again the
comparison line which they perceived as having the same length
as the standard line, by pressing the correspondent colored key
(pressured response). When children changed their first correct
response and complied with peers by adopting their incorrect
response, this was considered as our key index of conformity.
We thus computed a social conformity score (ranging from 0 to
3) by summing the number of conformist pressured responses,
but only for those participants (N = 70)2 who always gave
correct autonomous responses in the first phase of each trial
(autonomous response).
Negativity/Threat Bias
Finally, after completing an unrelated measure about new foods
acceptance for different purposes, children performed two Dot-
probe tasks (MacLeod et al., 1986), one in which positive and
negative but not threatening images were presented, and one in
2Ninety-seven children were administered the task. Nine children did not
complete the whole task because either reported to be tired or verbally indicated
that they had not understood the instructions even after repeated explanations.
Twenty-seven children made at least one mistake in the autonomous response and
were thus excluded from the analyses (22 children made 1 mistake and 5 made 2
mistakes).
which positive and threatening images were employed. A pilot
study allowed us to select the stimuli (the pictures are available
upon request to the first author). Thirty-five children (68.6%
girls) aged 4–7 (M = 5.18; SD = 1.03) were asked to evaluate a
series of 35 images, each depicting a well-known Walt Disney
character. For each character, children reported whether they
knew him/her (yes/no), what his/her name was or in which
cartoon they had seen him/her, whether s/he was good or bad,
pleasant or unpleasant, whether they liked him/her (yes/no), and
whether they thought s/he is scary for children their age (yes/no).
We then selected as positive stimuli the characters known by
most children and judged by most of them as good, pleasant,
liked and not scaring. The characters known by most children
and judged as bad, unpleasant, disliked and not scaring were
selected as negative stimuli; threatening stimuli were considered
those negative stimuli (i.e., bad, unpleasant, and disliked) that
were additionally perceived as scaring by most children. Overall,
6 stimuli for each category were selected.
In the Dot-probe tasks, participants were initially presented
with a fixation cross for 300 ms and then two characters
belonging to two different categories (either positive vs. negative
but not threatening, or positive vs. negative and threatening)
were simultaneously presented; one stimulus appeared on the left
side of the screen, whereas the other appeared on the right side.
The relative position of the positive and negative stimulus was
randomized across trials. After 800ms the pictures of the two
characters disappeared and a gray dot was displayed on one side
of the screen where one of the two pictures had just been shown.
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Participants were instructed to “catch the littlemouse” (appearing
as a dot because it was very small) by pressing either the left or the
right key, according to the side where the “mouse” was presented.
After participants had provided their response there was a 500ms
interval before the following trial started. The relative order of the
2 Dot-probe tasks, involving either negative but not threatening
stimuli or negative and threatening stimuli, in addition to
positive stimuli, was counterbalanced across participants. The
first Dot-probe task that was administered was preceded by an
8-trials practice block, while each test block included 40 trials.
The rationale was that responses would be faster when the
dot was displayed on the side where participants’ attention
was already allocated (compared to the other side). If negative
pictures draw spatial attention to their location (relative to the
location of positive pictures), we should expect faster reaction
times to targets displayed on the same side of negative rather
than positive stimuli. Before computing the scores, we dropped
5 participants who made more than 10% of errors (N = 95).
Following Elam et al. (2010) we also discarded trials with
reaction times shorter than 150 ms or longer than 2000 ms.
We then computed, for each participant, both a “negativity
bias” and a “threat bias” score using the following equation:
(right probe following left negative/threatening image − right
probe following right negative/threatening image) + (left probe
following right negative/threatening image− left probe following
left negative/threatening image)/2 (see MacLeod et al., 1986).
Positive values indicated that participant’s attention was more
attracted by negative/threatening stimuli than by positive stimuli.
Children were asked to complete the described tasks in the
following order: the IAT aimed at assessing implicit attitudes
toward order and chaos, the conformity task and the two Dot-
Probe tasks measuring negativity and threat bias.
RESULTS
Descriptive statistics for each variable are reported in Table 1,
whereas correlations among measures are reported in Table 2.
Interestingly, mothers’ and fathers’ scores were significantly
correlated. The coefficients suggest that parents share some
similarity in their political ideology but also that the overlap is
only partial, thus highlighting the importance of analyzing the
influence of each parent on children’s responses while controlling
for the potential influence of the other parent.
Preliminary analyses showed that there was no difference in
children’s responses as a function of school, class, age, number
of brothers/sisters and birth order. Only for the IAT measure,
assessing the attitudes toward order vs. chaos, the main effects of
gender, t(98) = 2.44, p= 0.016, and blocks order, t(98) = 5.93, p <
0.001, were statistically significant: Male respondents displayed
more positive implicit attitudes toward order (M = 0.99, SD =
0.64) as compared to female respondents (M = 0.65, SD= 0.73),
and IAT scores were generally higher when the compatible block
was presented first (M = 1.16, SD = 0.61) than when it was
presented after the non-compatible block (M = 0.43; SD= 0.61).
For this reason, we controlled for the effects of gender and blocks
order only in the main analyses involving the IAT measure.
TABLE 1 | Descriptive statistics.
N Min Max M SD
IAT order vs. chaos 100 −0.76 2.52 0.82 0.71
Threat bias 95 −157.18 356.35 10.51 82.84
Negativity bias 95 −245.78 137.99 −13.95 7.73
Social conformity 70 0.00 3.00 1.00 1.10
Mother RWA 102 1.33 3.67 2.71 0.53
Mother SDO 102 1.00 5.00 1.97 0.70
Father RWA 85 1.42 4.08 2.81 0.56
Father SDO 86 1.00 4.50 1.96 0.78
Mother social desirability 102 2.17 4.69 3.40 0.49
Father social desirability 86 1.46 4.69 3.40 0.58
In addition, in all the analyses, we controlled for parents’
tendency to provide socially desirable responses; to this end, we
regressed parental RWA and SDO on their Social desirability
scores, saved the non-standardized residuals and then used these
adjusted variables in the subsequent analyses in which such
variables were entered as predictors of children’s responses.
Results of these linear regression analyses are reported in Table 3.
Implicit Attitudes toward Order vs. Chaos
Results of linear regression analyses showed that fathers’ SDO
scores were predictive of children’s IAT scores, so that children
displayed a stronger preference for order as their fathers’ level
of authoritarian dominance increased. No effect was found in
relation to mothers’ SDO, as well as in relation to the RWA scores
of both mothers and fathers.
Social Conformity
As for the social conformity task, the RWA score of mothers
(but not that of fathers) significantly and positively predicted
children’s responses, while the SDO score of fathers (but not
that of mothers) negatively predicted them. In other words,
children were more conformist to allegedly erroneous peers as
their mothers’ level of authoritarian submission increased and
their fathers’ level of authoritarian dominance decreased.
Negativity/Threat Bias
Finally, the RWA score of the mothers was a positive and
significant predictor of children’s threat bias, whereas the RWA
of the fathers was unrelated to children’s responses in the task
(see Table 3). Interestingly, no effect emerged in relation to
SDO confirming, as predicted, that authoritarian submission, as
captured by responses to the RWA scale, is a stronger predictor,
as compared to SDO, of the tendency to carefully monitor for the
presence of threatening stimuli in the environment. Neither SDO
nor RWA scores were related to responses in the Dot-probe task
in which negative but not threatening stimuli were presented.
This further suggests that mothers’ RWA is likely to specifically
influence children’s security needs, as indexed by their tendency
to carefully monitor for stimuli that are not only negative but also
able to elicit threat.
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TABLE 2 | Correlations among measures, for all participants.
2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. IAT order vs. chaos −0.072 −0.095 −0.072 −0.060 −0.030 −0.059 0.300**
2. Threat bias 0.042 0.256* 0.206* −0.063 0.031 0.046
3. Negativity bias −0.238 0.024 −0.069 0.030 0.083
4. Social conformity 0.175 0.042 −0.093 −0.284*
5. Mother RWAa 0.442*** 0.427*** 0.282**
6. Mother SDOa 0.308*** 0.527***
7. Father RWAa 0.278***
8. Father SDOa
aNon-standardized residuals of each measure regressed on social desirability score.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
TABLE 3 | Results of linear regressions on children’s measures predicted by parents’ measures.
IAT order vs. chaos Threat bias Negativity bias Social conformity
β t p β t p β t p β t p
(Constant) 4.81 0.000 1.01 0.316 −2.40 0.019 7.89 0.000
Child’s gender −0.26** −2.81 0.006
Blocks order 0.51*** 5.38 0.000
Mother SDOa −0.12 −1.07 0.290 −0.14 −0.94 0.351 −0.19 −1.27 0.210 0.11 0.70 0.489
Mother RWAa −0.05 −0.43 0.666 0.29* 2.03 0.046 −0.03 −0.19 0.847 0.37* 2.33 0.024
Father SDOa 0.30** 2.77 0.007 0.08 0.57 0.573 0.21 1.42 0.161 −0.41** −2.85 0.006
Father RWAa −0.16 −1.55 0.126 −0.09 −0.64 0.524 0.03 0.20 0.845 −0.17 −1.18 0.245
R2 0.44*** 0.06 0.04 0.23*
aNon-standardized residuals of each measure regressed on parent’s social desirability score.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
DISCUSSION
The present study explored the general hypothesis that 4–6 years
old children might differ in their socio-cognitive motivations as a
function of parental ideology, differentiating between two facets
of ideology, namely authoritarian submission (i.e., RWA) and
authoritarian dominance (i.e., SDO). Results were only partially
in line with the main prediction regarding the relevance of
parents in the transmission of ideology-related characteristics
among children. In particular, interesting distinct results were
obtained in relation to right-wing authoritarianism and social
dominance orientation of mothers and fathers, although with
several caveats that will be later discussed.
Children were administered three tasks aimed at assessing
their socio-cognitive motivations. More specifically, automatic
attention to threatening stimuli was used as a proxy for assessing
children’s existential need for security, implicit preference for
order vs. chaos was a proxy of epistemic need for certainty,
and behavior in a conformity to peer task was intended to tap
relational need for affiliation.
To start with needs for security and certainty, only mothers’
RWA scores (but not mothers’ SDO scores and fathers’ SDO and
RWA scores) appeared to be significant predictors of children’s
level of threat bias whereas only fathers’ SDO (but not fathers’
RWA scores andmothers’ SDO and RWA scores) was a predictor
of the implicit attitudes toward order vs. chaos. This pattern
of results might be explained on the basis of the different
underpinnings of RWA and SDO. When mothers perceive the
world as a dangerous place, as indexed by high scores on RWA,
this might increase their children’s threat bias and anxiety when
exposed to frightening stimuli (e.g., de Rosnay et al., 2006). In the
case of fathers, their view of the world as a competitive jungle,
that would benefit from a more defined structure and hierarchy,
seems to be associated to children’s stronger need for order and
regularity. This is partially inconsistent with the results by Van
Hiel et al. (2004), showing that individuals’ need for simple
structure predicted not only their SDO but also, and even more
strongly, their RWA score. It should be stressed that previous
research has mainly focused on university students and adult
respondents, whereas still limited data is available in relation to
preschool-aged children.
The fact that different patterns emerged in relation to the
RWA and SDO scores assessed from the two parents was not
specifically predicted. Nonetheless, the obtained findings seem to
be consistent with the idea that each parent exerts a distinctive
influence in different domains (O’Bryan et al., 2004). More
specifically, more emotionally-related responses (i.e., threat bias)
were influenced by the female parent who is stereotypically
associated to the emotional sphere. In contrast, the need for
order and control over the environment (i.e., implicit attitudes
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toward order vs. chaos) was influenced by the male parent who
is stereotypically considered as more agentic in the structuring
of the social and physical environment. This is admittedly a post-
hoc tentative explanation and future research is needed to address
both the consistency and meaning of the reported finding.
In addition, the link between mothers’ RWA and children’s
responses in the Dot-probe tasks was restricted to situations in
which threatening stimuli were presented. Indeed, when negative
but not threatening pictures were displayed no effect emerged,
suggesting thatmothers’ authoritarian submission does not play a
key role in relation to an overall evaluative dimension (i.e., when
stimuli are either positive or negative) but only when the stimuli
are able to trigger strong emotional responses, as in the case of
threatening stimuli.
Children were also asked to complete a social conformity
task, as a proxy for assessing relational needs. Interestingly,
the two aforementioned sides of the authoritarianism coin, as
measured by the RWA and SDO scales, had opposite relations
with children’s social conformity. Indeed, conformity increased
at increasing levels of authoritarianism submission (i.e., RWA)
and decreased at increasing levels of dominance (i.e., SDO).
Moreover, mothers and fathers appeared again to exert specific
influences in line with gender stereotypes, as discussed above.
In particular, mothers’ RWA appeared to be a positive predictor
of children’s conformity, whereas fathers’ SDO was a negative
predictor of the same measure. In other words, mothers who
value obedience and conventionalism, as they view the world
as a dangerous place, seem to boost children’s relational needs
of affiliation and thus their tendency to follow their peers,
even when they provide incorrect responses. Conversely, fathers
characterized by a need of prevailing and being superior, as they
view the world as a competitive place, seem to dampen their
children needs of affiliation and thus their tendency to conform
to incorrect peers; in contrast, they seem to promote a desire to
confirm the correct response that provides order and stability in
the perception of the world. It is worth noting that each parent’s
influence seems to be exerted through the gender stereotypical
dimension of authoritarianism: submission (which is expected
from women) for mothers and dominance (which is expected
from men) for fathers.
These results on social conformity are in line but also extend
previous evidence by Reifen Tagar et al. (2014). Indeed, they
found that children of parents high in authoritarian and social
conformity values, were more likely to trust and follow both a
conventional and an ambiguously conventional adult in labeling
some objects. In other words, children of more conservative
parents were more conformists to adults in general and to
conventional adults in particular. In the current study, we
assessed children’s tendency to conform to unknown peers and
not to adults who adhered to convention (Reifen Tagar et al.,
2014). This allows us to tap two different crucial aspects of
conformity behavior in relation to the two different faces of
authoritarianism, submission and dominance.
To summarize, the present study showed that mothers
with stronger authoritarian-submissive tendencies had children
displaying higher vigilance to threatening stimuli and higher
level of conformity toward incorrect peers, suggesting that they
may have high existential and relational needs for security
and affiliation; in contrast, fathers with stronger authoritarian-
dominant tendencies had children displaying more positive
implicit attitudes toward order vs. chaos and lower level of
conformity toward incorrect peers, suggesting that they may
have high epistemic needs for certainty and a stronger tendency
to reaffirm their autonomous view of the world. Concluding,
current results suggest once again (see Reifen Tagar et al., 2014;
Dennis et al., 2015) that parents may start shaping the “political
ideology” of their children from a very early stage of development,
well before political issues become a topic of explicit discussions
between parents and their children.
Limitations and Future Directions
As previously remarked, this study only represents an initial
exploration of the influence of parents’ authoritarianism
dimensions on children’s socio-cognitive responses and thus
several limitations must be acknowledged. First, one might
appropriately observe that RWA scale is tridimensional and
thus is not a “pure” measure of submission (Duckitt and
Bizumic, 2013). However, it has to be noted that we used a
brief version of the RWA scale, with only 12 items (Funke,
2005; Roccato et al., 2009). This scale has been found to have
a three-dimensional factorial structure (defined by authoritarian
submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism), but
the authors of the Italian validation (Roccato et al., 2009)
highlighted the poor reliability of the three substantive factors
and the very strong correlations among them, thus warning
against mechanically considering the brief version of the scale
as three-dimensional. Therefore, we also decided to calculate a
single score for the RWA scale, observing that the reliability of
the overall scale was relatively low, but still acceptable (i.e., α =
0.63 for mothers and α= 0.64 for fathers), whereas the reliability
of the subscales was very low.
In addition, it has to be acknowledged that despite the
significant results reported and discussed above, in the current
study several effects were non-significant. Therefore, even the
single significant effects that have been presented here should be
placed in the context of an overall fuzzy picture. For this reason,
future research recruiting a wider sample is necessary in order to
further investigate and better understand the relations between
parents’ SDO and RWA and their children socio-cognitive
motives. Moreover, the current mixed results may also indicate
that the relations between the studied variables are very complex
and somehow relatively weak and, as a consequence, unstable.
It is likely that other variables do play an important role and
thus future studies may include somemoderators while analyzing
these relations. Our position is that the mixed findings presented
in the present paper, although suggestive, should be taken with
extreme caution being in no way conclusive about an actual
link between parents’ ideology and children’s socio-cognitive
responses. Nevertheless, both the significant and non-significant
results obtained in the current study may represent important
additional elements for a comprehensive meta-analytic approach
to the issue that might hopefully provide more conclusive
responses.
Finally, it has to be noted that this is a cross-sectional
correlational study, thus causal relations cannot be determined.
Although mutual influence cannot be excluded (Miklikowska,
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2016), we can reasonably assume that parental ideological
beliefs are more likely to affect children’s responses, rather than
the reverse, at least in the case of very young respondents,
such as the preschoolers involved in our study. However,
longitudinal research is necessary in order to provide more
straightforward results not only about the casual relations
but also about the development stability of these embryonic
differences. Some studies have already shown that some features
detected in children (e.g., early temperament) may be correlated
with political ideology in adulthood (e.g., Block and Block,
2006; Fraley et al., 2012) suggesting that children’s behaviors
can actually be predictive of later more sophisticated political
attitudes.
Notwithstanding these limitations, the present work adds to
the recent and so far limited literature suggesting the existence,
at a very young age, of ideology-based differences in children of
conservative and liberal parents, also providing some hints about
the possible different and specific influences of the two parents
and of the two different aspects of authoritarianism.
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